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ACCOUNTABILITY VERSUS PRIVACY: THE
PLIGHT OF INSTITUTIONALIZED
EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED CHILDREN
Katherine M. Lordi*
I.

Introduction

Recent disclosures of scandal in the operation and management
of custodial health care institutions' have led to renewed fervor for
public accountability of such institutions.! While the public's "need
to know" is a helpful tool in preventing future Willowbrook-type
scandals, it must be balanced against the institutionalized patient's
right to be free from unwarranted invasions of privacy. Recognition
of the responsibilities of institutional directors and public funding
officials as public trustees would be a development as commendable
as it is overdue. However, no attempts have been made to determine
the extent of such responsibility; the public's demand is potentially
one of accountability for its own sake.
A twofold task must be confronted. First, the limits of institutional and managerial accountability must be defined. Second, the
public's need to know must be balanced with a respect for the patient's personal privacy and material needs. This Article will
examine the individual's right to privacy in relation to the state's
interest in a smoothly-functioning system of mental health care for
minors, in order to elicit some general guidelines for institutional
accountability.
* A.B., Trinity College (Washington, D.C.); J.D., Fordham University School of Law.
Member of the New Jersey Bar. Ms. Lordi serves as counsel to Mount Saint Joseph's Children's Center, Totowa, New Jersey.
1. See, e.g., Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd on other grounds,
535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973);
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), modified sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt,

503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974);

NEW YORK STATE MORELAND ACT COMM'N, REGULATING NURSING

HOME CARE: THE PAPER TIGERS 2-4 (1975). See also N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1975, at 30, col. 1;
Feb. 22, 1975, at 13, col. 1; Jan. 21, 1975, at 20, col. 1; Jan. 12, 1975, at 40, col. 3; Sept. 6,
1974, at 1, col. 1.
2. See, e.g., N.Y. Pua. HEALTH LAW § 2807-a (McKinney Supp. 1976) (requiring certification of financial statements and financial information for all nursing homes); NEW YORK
STATE MORELAND ACT COMM'N, LONG TERM CARE REGULATION: PAST LAPSES, FUTURE PROSPECTS

40-87 (1976).
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Rights in Conflict: A Case Study

Recent developments in the supervision of New Jersey institutions underscore the tension between the rights of patients and the
duty of public funding officials to account for disbursements made
from the public treasury. The New Jersey Department of Institutions and Agencies (DIA), which has statutory authority to inspect
all custodial health care facilities within the state,3 recently initiated procedures for evaluation of the quality of care delivered by
residential treatment centers for emotionally disturbed children.,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:1-14 (West Supp. 1976) provides:
In addition to the jurisdiction and power conferred upon the commissioner over the
institutions and noninstitutional agencies named in section 30:1-7 of this Title, he shall
have supervision over all institutions and organizations, whether county, municipal,
public or private, to which payments are made from the treasury of the State, directly
or indirectly, for or on account of the board and maintenance of any persons admitted
or committed thereto, with the right of visitation and inspection at any and all times,
for the purpose of determining the conditions, circumstances and surroundings under
which such persons so admitted or committed are lodged, boarded, cared for and
maintained. In the execution of this power any member of the State board, the commissioner, or his duly authorized agent, shall have the right of admission to all parts
of any building or buildings in which such persons are lodged, cared for or treated, as
often as may be necessary. The books, records and accounts of such institution or
organization shall be open to his inspection, or for inspection and audit by the State
Auditor, or any of his subordinates, in so far as they relate to the receipt and expenditure of State moneys, in order to determine whether the amount so paid by the State
is a proper charge, which question the commissioner shall determine, and also to
determine whether such persons so admitted or committed are properly and adequately boarded, lodged, treated, cared for and maintained. The extent and results of
such supervision and inspection shall be included in the annual or any special report
of the commissioner with such recommendations [as] he may deem necessary.
Recently, DIA was divided into two departments: the Department of Corrections; and the
Department of Human Services.
4. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:1-15 (West Supp. 1976) provides:
The commissioner and the State board shall have the power of visitation and inspection of all county and city jails or places of detention, county or city workhouses,
county penitentiaries, county mental and tuberculosis hospitals, poor farms, almshouses, county and municipal schools of detention, and privately maintained institutions and noninstitutional agencies for the care and treatment of the mentally ill, the
blind, the deaf, the mentally retarded, or other institutions, and noninstitutional agencies conducted for the benefit of the physically and mentally defective, or the furnishing of board, lodging or care for children. The commissioner or his duly authorized
agent, and any member of the State board shall be admitted to any and all parts of
any such institutions at any time, for the purpose of inspecting and observing the
physical condition thereof, the methods of management and operation thereof, the
physical condition of the inmates, the care, treatment and discipline thereof, and also
to determine whether such persons so admitted or committed are properly and ade3.
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Included in these procedures are mandatory interviews of resident
children by a professional evaluation team. The DIA maintains that
such interviews are an essential means of discovering potential
abuses within the institution.' While an interview, however brief,
may not seem to constitute a significant deprivation of personal
rights, the children's severe emotional and psychological disturbances render the state procedure far from innocuous. The children's
emotional and psychological well-being is thus set off against the
DIA's concept of its own duty to account for the disbursement of
public funds.
Emotionally disturbed youngsters who are placed in residential
treatment centers have frequently been referred to the facility by a
court or court-related agency. Such children are painfully aware
quately boarded, lodged, treated, cared for and maintained. The commissioner and the
State board may make such report with reference to the result of such observation and
inspection and recommendation with reference thereto, as they may determine.
It is interesting to note that while two procedures are specifically authorized- inspection
of facilities and review of financial records-no mention is made regarding interview of residents. In light of the principle that an administrative agency is a creature of statute and
possesses only those powers which are statutorily bestowed, In re Guardianship of C., 98 N.J.
Super. 474, 494 (Union Co. Juv. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1967), the DIA's authority to compel resident
interviews is questionable. Neither the bill's legislative history nor the statement of purpose
which accompanied it indicates any intent to permit such interviews. See 1968 N.J. Laws ch.
85 (current version at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:1-15 (West Supp. 1976)).
5. Robert B. Nicholas, Acting Chief of the Bureau of Residential Services of the DIA's
Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) recently described the objectives of the evaluation procedure to be:
1. To improve the effectiveness of institutional placements by providing the District
Offices of the [DYFSI with improved information on the types and levels of treatment
currently provided by child care agencies;
2. To provide the Bureau [of Residential Services] with improved programmatic
and fiscal information as part of an effort to set more equitable reimbursement rates
for agencies providing quality care;
3. To gather information for use by the Division [of Residential Services] in improving contract and fiscal accountability for all agencies receiving placements;
4. To provide the Division [of Residential Services] with information for use in
developing programmatic and fiscal standards;
5. To assess the effectiveness of current expenditures for treatment; and
6. To increase the level of federal financial participation.
Letter from Robert B. Nicholas to Rev. Robert J. vitello, Director of Mount Saint Joseph's
Children's Center, Totowa, N.J. (April 19, 1976).
6. For example, in New Jersey, the DIA's DYFS is the state agency responsible for dealing
with child welfare problems. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-2 (West Supp. 1976). The DYFS refers
children to various institutions and out-patient facilities when the courts or non-legal authorities have deemed such children to be in need of specified services or supervision.
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that their existence and well-being are closely entwined in state
operations; before the children are admitted to a residential treatment center, they have usually been interviewed, analyzed and
observed by several physicians, psychologists and social workers.
Often, such children have spent a substantial portion of their lives
in other institutions or foster homes, and have endured many experiences foreign to the average American child. Alleviation of their
emotional problems depends on an effective and continuous course
of treatment, and courts have repeatedly upheld the child's right to
receive such treatment.7 Official intervention by state examiners
endangers the efficacy and continuity of such treatment.'
7. The leading case in this area is Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
modified sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). In response to evidence
which portrayed disgraceful conditions in Alabama state institutions for some five thousand
retarded children, the district court imposed elaborate standards designed to improve living
conditions, disciplinary policies, staffing ratios, and other facets of institutional management.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld these standards, adding that, "[T]he
provision of treatment to those the state has involuntarily confined in mental hospitals is
necessary to make the state's actions in confining and continuing to confine those individuals
constitutional. That being the case, the state may not fail to provide treatment for budgetary
reasons alone." 503 F.2d at 1315. Where all patients in an institution are subject to similar
restrictions on personal freedom, the voluntariness of placement is presumably not a material
factor. Developments similar to Wyatt have occurred with regard to juvenile detention. See
Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974); Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D.
Tex. 1973); Martarella v. Kelley, 359 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Inmates of Boys' Training
School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972); see also Burt, Developing Constitutional
Rights of, in, and for Children, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 118 (Summer 1975); Symposium,
The Right to Treatment, 57 GEO. L.J. 673 (1969); Comment, Wyatt v. Stickney and the Right
of the Civilly Committed Mental Patients to Adequate Treatment, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1282
(1973); Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REv. 1134 (1967); Note, Civil
Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967). But cf. New
York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 762 (E.D.N.Y.
1973), where Judge Orrin Judd indicated that while due process "may be an element in the
right to protection from harm . . . it does not establish a right to treatment."
8. It must be remembered that children under scrutiny suffer from various types and
degrees of emotional disturbances, and may be unable to cope with stressful situations. Yet
even children who have experienced no abnormal emotional disturbances display behavioral
withdrawal when confronted with unfamiliar persons or situations. One authority notes:
The withdrawal response temporarily removes the child from the feared situation,
but the tendency to withdraw becomes stronger each time the child practices this
behavior. This defense is therefore often maladaptive, and the child who refuses to
cope with stressful situations may eventually become fearful of all problems and
stresses, and may never learn to handle adequately the crises that are inevitable in
the course of development.
P. MUSSEN, J. CONGER, and J. KAGAN, CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND PERSONALITY 518 (3d ed. 1969).
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To be sure, the DIA is entitled to conduct reasonable investigations to determine the propriety of public expenditures; yet these
inquiries must necessarily be limited by the child's right to privacy,
dignity, and freedom from interference in the therapeutic process.
Thus, the state's right to information ends where the child's right
of privacy begins.
III.
A.

The Parameters of Privacy

Historical Development

The concept of an individual "right to privacy" was first expounded in 1890 in the now-famous law review article written by
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis. 0 Examining numerous
cases in which relief had been granted on the basis of defamation,
invasion of property rights, or an implied contract, Warren and
Brandeis concluded that the decisions were based upon a broader
principle deserving separate recognition. The result was the
emergence of an individual's right to privacy:"
The right of property in its widest sense, including all possession, including
all rights and privileges, and hence embracing the right to an inviolate personality, affords alone that broad basis upon which the protection which the
individual demands can be rested.

The principles enunciated by Warren and Brandeis, after surmounting initial resistance in the courts, 2 eventually gained judiRepeated exposure to the probing of state investigators might tend to increase the occurrence
of at least one form of maladaptive behavior in some institutionalized children.
9. Prior to 1890, some courts seemed to be moving toward a recognition of a right to be
let alone. See, e.g., De May v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881), where relief was
granted to a woman who complained of a stranger's intrusion upon her childbirth. The court
stated, "To the plaintiff the occasion was a most sacred one and no one had a right to intrude
unless invited or because of some real and pressing necessity ....

The plaintiff had a legal

right to the privacy of her apartment at such a time, and the law secures to her this right by
requiring others to observe it, and to abstain from its violation." Id. at 165-66, 9 N.W. at 149
(emphasis added).
10. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAov. L. REV. 193 (1890).
11. Id. at 211.
12. New York, the first state to come to grips with the problem, rejected the existence of
the right to privacy in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442
(1902), a case involving commercial appropriation of a young lady's photograph without her
consent. The decision proved so unpopular that the New York legislature soon enacted a law
making it both a misdemeanor and a tort to use a person's photograph or likeness for advertising or trade purposes without the person's written consent. 1903 N.Y. Laws ch. 132, §§ 1-2.
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cial recognition as a new tort action; 3 yet for decades, this tort was
limited to situations arising out of unauthorized appropriation of a
person's name or likeness for commercial purposes.' 4 Eventually,
courts expanded the right to include physical intrusions upon a
person's home 5 or upon him in a place of business,'" electronic
eavesdropping, 7 unauthorized public disclosure of private facts, 8
publication of misleading or defamatory information,' 9 and peering
into windows.'" The individual's interest in an "inviolate personal2
ity" ' has blossomed into the "substantial right of legal interest '

2

which Brandeis and Warren foresaw.
Recognition of privacy as a fundamental right resulted in part
from several challenges to the enforcement of criminal statutes.2 3
Several landmark rulings by the Supreme Court24 have established
13. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
14. See, e.g., Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938).
15. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Williams, 108 Ga. App. 21, 132 S.E.2d 206 (1963); Welsh
v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952).
16. See, e.g., Byfield v. Candler, 33 Ga. App. 275, 125 S.E. 905 (1924); Newcomb Hotel
Co. v. Corbett, 27 Ga. App. 365, 108 S.E. 309 (1921).
17. See, e.g., LaCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 114 Ohio App. 299, 182 N.E.2d 15 (1961);
Roach v. Harper, 143 W.Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958); McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939); Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d
46 (1931)..
18. See, e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931); see also Brents v.
Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
19. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Ideal Pub. Corp., 210 N.Y.S.2d 928 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Russell v.
Marboro Books, 18 Misc.2d 166, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Martin v. Johnson Pub. Co.,
157 N.Y.S.2d 409 (Sup. Ct. 1966). See also Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15
VAND. L. REV. 1093 (1962).
20. See, e.g, Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, 88 So.2d 716 (La. App. 1956); Moore v. New
York Elevated R.R., 130 N.Y. 523, 29 N.E. 997 (1892); Note, Criminationof Peeping Toms
and Other Men of Vision, 5 ARK. L. REv. 388 (1951).
21. Warren, supra note 10, at 205.
22. Id. at 205-06, n.1.
23. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), where the Court reversed a conviction
obtained upon evidence illegally obtained during an unlawful search of defendant's home.
The Court expanded the exclusionary rule expressed in earlier cases (Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)), to encompass the individual's
"indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property.
... 367 U.S.
at 647, quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
24. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), where the Court ruled that the right to
privacy covers a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy through abortion. The Court
stated:
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of decisions,
however, going back perhaps as far as Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,
251 (1891), the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee
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the right and granted it constitutional protection; privacy is now
recognized as "no less important than any other right carefully and
particularly reserved to the people." 25 Privacy's stature as a
"fundamental liberty" requires the state to show a "compelling
state interest" for any infringement on the right.2"
The right to privacy differs from all other fundamental liberties
in that it is not specifically stated in the Constitution. However, the
Supreme Court has held the right to be protected by the first
amendment,27 the fourth and fifth amendments," and ninth amendof certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. . . . These
decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental"
or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" ...
are included in this guarantee of
personal privacy.
Id. at 152-53. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where the Court reversed
the conviction of a Planned Parenthood League Director for providing married couples with
information, instruction and medical advice regarding birth control methods. The Court
recognized a "zone of privacy" and held the criminal statutes involved unconstitutional on
the principle that "a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." Id. at 485, quoting NAACP v. Alabama,
377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
25. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
26. The "compelling state interest" rule, which the Court has repeatedly applied during
the last decade, prohibits the states from regulating "fundamental liberties" unless a compelling state interest for such regulation can be shown; mere rational purpose will not justify
state interference with these rights. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In
addition, regulations which delimit fundamental rights will not be enforced unless they are
designed to accomplish the specific goal(s) alleged to be of compelling interest. Kramer v.
Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969). See also YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048
(D.N.J. 1972), where the court stated that such state intrusions into constitutionally protected areas, including the emerging right to privacy, must be founded on a compelling state
interest which overrides private rights. Id. at 1072.
27. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See also Justice Fortas' dissent in Time, Inc.
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 412 (1967):
I do not believe that the First Amendment precludes effective protection of the right
of privacy-or, for that matter, an effective law of libel . . . . There are great and
important values in our society, none of which is greater than those reflected in the
First Amendment, but which are also fundamental and entitled to this Court's careful
respect and protection. Among these is the right to privacy, which has been eloquently
extolled by scholars and members of this Court.
28. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), where Justice Clark's majority opinion
indicated that, "Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable
against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government."
Id. at 655 (emphasis added). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court held that the
fifth amendment "enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not
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ment,29 the "penumbra" of the Bill of Rights,3" and the fourteenth
amendment."
B.

Application to Minors
Traditionally, courts have not afforded minors the full panoply of
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. State interests in promoting
child welfare have long been thought to justify more pervasive state
controls over children's affairs than are permitted in adult matters. 2
However, the Supreme Court has declared that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone," 33 and
has extended many fundamental rights to juveniles.
First amendment rights to free speech and free exercise of religion
have been extended to minors on several occasions.3 4 The most important basis for this development has been the recognition of chil3
dren as "persons" within the meaning of the Constitution: 1
force him to surrender to his detriment." Id. at 484.
29. See Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
491 (1965):
The Ninth Amendment to the Constitution may be regarded by some as a recent
discovery ... but since 1791 it has been a basic part of the Constitution which we are
sworn to uphold. To hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted in
our society as the right of privacy in marriage may be infringed because that right is
not guaranteed in so many words by the first eight amendments to the Constitution is
to ignore the Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever.
30. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
31. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
32. In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), the Court recognized that, "There is
evidence . . . that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitious care and
regenerative treatment postulated for children." Id. at 556. Yet several of the Court's own
decisions seem to have furthered this problem. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528 (1971) (juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to jury trials in juvenile court proceedings); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (individual states have the right to adjust
the definition of obscenity as applied to minors); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)
(the state's power to control public proclamation of religious beliefs was greater over children
than over adults).
33. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
34. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (the protection of
symbolic speech by wearing armbands in protest of the Vietnam war); School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (no compulsory recitation of prayers in public schools); Engle
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (no compulsory recitation of a "non-denominational" prayer
in school); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (upholding
students' refusal to salute the flag on religious grounds).
35. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
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School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in school as well as out of school are "persons" under our Constitution.
They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just
as they themselves must respect their obligation to the State.

In re Gault3 marked the beginning of a new era in the legal development of children's rights. While a few early cases had recognized
some procedural and equal protection rights of children, 37 the Gault
ruling provided the impetus for additional progress. Fifteen year old
Gerald Gault was brought before an Arizona juvenile court and
charged with making a lewd telephone call." He was found guilty,
and was committed to the State Industrial School as a juvenile
delinquent." His parents brought a habeas corpus petition, and
challenged the constitutionality of the Arizona Juvenile Code,
claiming that it denied their son the benefits of procedural due
process. The Supreme Court held that in cases where incarceration
may result, juvenile defendants are entitled to due process protections. These include adequate written notice of pending
charges,4 0 notice of the right to counsel,4' privileges against selfincrimination," and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses ."
In the wake of Gault, another important protection for
juvenile
rights was secured in In re Winship." A twelve year old boy had been
charged with commission of an act which, had he been an adult,
would have constituted the crime of larceny." The New York Family
Court Act provided that proof of the juvenile defendant's guilt was
36. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See also Dorzen & Reznek, In re Gault and the Future of Juvenile
Law, 1 FAM. L.Q. 1, 33 (1967); Paulsen, The ConstitutionalDomestication of the Juvenile
Court, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 233.
37. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (children entitled to equal
protection of laws in obtaining public education); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (education in accordance with religion is granted first and fourteenth amendment
liberties). See 5 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 155 (1976) (removal of foster children from foster homes
without a prior hearing violates their rights to procedural due process under the Constitution).
38. 387 U.S. at 3-4.
39. Id. at 4.
40. Id.at 33.
41. Id. at 41.
42. Id. at 55.
43. Id. at 56-57.
44. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
45. Id. at 359-60.
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to be by a "preponderance of the evidence."" The family court
found the defendant guilty, 7 and the court of appeals affirmed. 8
The United States Supreme Court reversed, 4 holding that a finding
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required for conviction when
a juvenile is charged with an act which would be a crime if committed by an adult.50
The minor's right to privacy was first judicially recognized in
Merriken v. Cressman.1 A junior high school student sought to enjoin implementation of a school's drug prevention program whose
stated purpose was to aid school authorities in identifying potential
drug abusers. Identification was to be by means of a questionnaire
about family relationships and rearing. The district court issued an
injunction against use of the questionnaires stating, "[tihe fact
that the students are juveniles does not in any way invalidate their
right to assert their Constitutional right to privacy."" Examining
the proposed program, the Merriken court concluded that the
questionnaire was of a highly personal nature; furthermore, the
means used to inform the students and their parents about the
program's methods and goals did not approach the status of "informed consent.""3 Finally, the court noted that the testing methodology was of suspect statistical validity.5 '
46. N.Y. FAMILY COURT AcT § 744(b) (McKinney 1970), as amended, (McKinney Supp.
1976).
47. 397 U.S. at 360.
48. 24 N.Y.2d 196, 247 N.E.2d 253, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1969).
49. 397 U.S. at 361.
50. Id. at 367.
51. 364 F. Supp. 913, 918 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
52. Id. at 918.
53. Id. at 918-20. The court noted:
The facts as stated show that the letters to the parents [describing the testing programl were "selling devices" aimed at gaining consent without giving negative information that would make the parents completely aware of "the relevant circumstances
and likely consequences" of the Program. Mr. Streit, the man who conceived the CP1
program, admitted that the letter to the parents gave only one side of the test picture.
There were no statements to the parents concerning the self-fulfilling prophecy, scapegoating of those children who opted not to participate or the ultimate use of the data
as it would affect their children and law authorities who might find it necessary to use
that information to learn more about the drug situation in the local community.
Id. at 919.
54. Id. at 920. The only objective of the program was to identify patterns of answers
similar to those given by marijuana, amphetamine and LSD users. No mention of drugs was
made in the questionnaire, and there was no attempt to define what was meant by "drug
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Merriken's criticisms of the school's program deserve serious consideration in the analysis of all investigatory or diagnostic procedures involving institutionalized children. Unless a state program is
clearly outlined, has a stated purpose, and employs methods which
have been proven effective, it should be enjoined, pending investigation.5 A casual goal of ascertaining whether the institutionalized
child is happy or unhappy is perhaps as unconstitutional as it is
unrealistic. Institutionalized children frequently suffer from problems which markedly separate them from the majority of other
youths. Physical segregation of these so-called "problem" children
often crystallizes the emotional and psychological distinctions
which are at the root of their behavioral difficulties. Subjecting such
a child to an interview by a state representative completely strange
to the child, and unfamiliar with his background, is an invasion of
the personality of that child. Permitting such interviews without
prior development of therapeutically tested procedures is a reckless
approach at best.
While privacy is an emerging right, its place among the fundamental liberties is secure. The Merriken court stated: "This Court
would add that the right to privacy is on an equal or possibly more
elevated pedestal than some other individual Constitutional rights
and should be treated with as much deference as free speech." ' ,
Privacy rights of minors have been further enhanced by several
recent decisions dealing with the right to receive an abortion. In Foe
v. Vanderhoo,5 7 a minor plaintiff contended that a Colorado statute
which required parental consent to an abortion violated her right to
privacy as guaranteed by the first, ninth and fourteenth amendments. Two central issues were presented to the court. First, did the
right to privacy as developed in Roe v. Wade" and Doe v. Bolton"
abuse." The study did not indicate what a potential drug user was, and it did not clearly
establish the correlation of the testing methods employed to the intended results.
55. One commentator has suggested a broad test to evaluate the appropriateness of state
testing methods: "The proper criteria can readily be drawn from Supreme Court decisions
protecting other 'fundamental rights' from state intrustion-that is, has the need for the state
intervention been convincingly identified, and is there a close correspondence between that
need and the means proposed to satisfy that need?" Burt, supra note 7, at 127.
56. 364 F. Supp. at 918.
57. 389 F. Supp. 947 (D. Colo. 1975).
58. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
59. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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extend to minors? Second, did any compelling state interests0 justify the difference in treatment between minors and adults? On both
issues, the Foe court ruled in favor of the right to privacy; no sufficient state interest in discriminating was discerned. Adopting the
Supreme Court's rationale in Roe v. Wade, the court classified privacy as a right which is "a personal one guaranteeing to the individual the right to make basic decisions concerning his or her life without interference from the government,"'" and concluding that
"[m]inors are entitled to this personal right as well as adults.""2
The Foe court indicated that some state regulation infringing the
right to privacy may be appropriate. 3 Such infringement is no
casual matter: 4
Thus the state may infringe on the constitutional right to privacy; however,
before it may do so, it must demonstrate interests so compelling as to justify
the intrusion on the fundamental right involved. The legislation must be
narrowly drawn and confined or restricted to the compelling state interests.

Recently, in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,"5 the Supreme
Court of the United States upheld the minor's right to privacy in
an abortion situation. Striking down Missouri's parental consent
law, the Court emphatically stated that the minor's right to privacy
was the same as that enjoyed by an adult: "Constitutional rights do
not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the
state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."6
It is apparent that the child has a clear and unequivocal right to
privacy. He is entitled to the same constitutional protections given
60. See note 26 supra.
61. 389 F. Supp. at 953, citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
62. 389 F. Supp. at 953. In Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1973), rev'd on
other grounds, 417 U.S. 281 (1974), a similar controversy resulted in the invalidation of a
Florida parental consent statute. The court declared, "[A] pregnant woman under 18 years
of age cannot, under the law, be distinguished from one over 18 years of age in reference to
'fundamental', 'personal',constitutional rights." 376 F. Supp. at 698.
63. 389 F. Supp. at 954.
64. Id., citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973). The court indicated that "[aifter
careful consideration of the issues involved, we find that [the consent statute] as it relates
to the necessity of parental or guardian consent in order for minors to obtain legal abortions
is unconstitutional. The statute is overbroad in its reach and is violative of the fundamental
right to privacy." Id. at 951.
65. 96 S.Ct. 2831 (1976).
66. Id. at 2843.
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to adults, and he is subject to the same reasonable level of state
control. 7 Age alone is not a factor of sufficient weight to affect the
liberties of institutionalized emotionally-disturbed children. Absent
a compelling state interest, invasion of personality must be prohibited, regardless of a patient's position in the family or ability to act
independently of others.
IV.

Privacy in an Institutional Setting

Recent decisions recognizing the child's right to privacy compel
re-examination of the state's administrative and supervisory role in
providing care and maintenance for institutionalized children.
Catch-all classification of procedures as being "for the child's welfare" falls far short of the "compelling state interest" standard."
The state has an interest in protecting child welfare; and that interest permits the state to exercise greater authority over juveniles
than over adults." Equally apparent is the state's interest in supervising the operations of custodial institutions within its jurisdiction.
Yet even if these interests are deemed "compelling," state infringement upon privacy rights must be kept within the confines of narrowly drawn regulations, restricted solely to the compelling interest.
Courts have repeatedly held that persons placed in institutions
have a constitutional right to receive treatment reasonably calculated to produce some cure or alleviation of symptoms." To meet
this end, elaborate conditions have at times been imposed on institutional directors and public funding officials. In Wyatt v.
Stickney,7' a federal district court took steps to correct horrendous
conditions in Alabama's institutions for the mentally ill.
"Minimum Constitutional Standards for Adequate Treatment of
the Mentally Ill"72 were drawn up; no less than thirty-five separate
67.
68.

See note 55 supra.
See note 26 supra, and accompanying text.

69. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541 (1966); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
70. Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 535
F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); New York State
Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), modified sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Martare lla v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
71. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), modified sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
72. 344 F. Supp. at 379.
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conditions for promoting a "Humane Psychological and Physical
Environment"7 3 were promulgated. Significantly, the first condition
stated "[platients have a right to privacy and dignity."74
Commercial exploitation of mental patients has been restrained
when their privacy rights have been infringed. In Commonwealth v.
Wiseman,75 a motion picture producer obtained permission to film
inmate conditions at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at
Bridgewater. Permission was conditioned upon the producer's "fully
protecting" inmate rights and requiring that he not photograph
patients without first obtaining written releases. However, very few
releases were obtained. The court concluded that the defendant
producer had not fulfilled his agreement to protect the rights of the
patients and enjoined commercial showing of the film.7"
The rights of institutionalized children should be protected to the
greatest extent possible. At a minimum, the state should be required to adopt professionally-determined and therapeuticallytested investigation procedures, employ competent professional investigators, and take all necessary steps to avoid interrupting the
treatment which the children receive in the institution. For emotionally disturbed children, this treatment centers on the healing
and development of the personality. Investigators should be thoroughly briefed on each child's case history77 and should prepare
questions in advance. Any other procedure interrupts the course of
therapy and is inconsistent with the children's privacy rights which
clearly extend to children.7"
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 379-86.
Id. at 379.
356 Mass. 251, 249 N.E.2d 610 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970).
Id. at 259, 249 N.E.2d at 610.
Full knowledge of each child's case is stressed upon those who work with children. See
generally, A. FREDERICKSEN and P. MULLIGAN, THE CHILD AND His WELFARE (3d ed. 1972); L.
GEISER, THE ILLUSION OF CARING (1973); J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD AND A.J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973).
78. Included in this category are the right to acquire the intellectual and emotional skills
necessary to achieve individual aspirations and to cope effectively in our society, and, for
those who need remedial services, the right to care and treatment. See JOINT COMMISSION ON
MENTAL HEALTH OF CHILDREN, CRISIS IN MENTAL HEALTH 3 (1969). Child care professionals
consider emotional relationships as extremely vital to the disturbed child, who has often
witnessed destruction of key relationships. The child has often learned to suppress his or her
feelings or to suffer the agony of replacement; forcing such a child to reveal his or her feelings
to a stranger would undo much of what has been accomplished by therapy. See GEISER, supra
note 77, ch. 5.
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The availability of other sources of information, such as inspection of facilities, observation of children in programs, and auditing
of books,7 9 makes it unlikely that the state's compelling interest
can be served only by actual interviews of patients. Even if such
interviews are required, the state should be made to disclose their
objectives and the questions to be asked." The questions could then
be reviewed by institutional directors and the children could be
psychologically prepared for the visit.8 '
V.

Conclusion

While the right of privacy is not absolute,8 2 it is constitutionally
protected 3 and it does extend to children.8" Children have been
recognized as "persons" within the meaning of the Constitution8 5
and have been accorded rights equal to those enjoyed by adults.8
These rights have been held to preclude the need for parental consent to abortion87 and to prohibit school authorities from requiring
students to bare personal memories and experiences. 8
The basis for state intervention in the lives of juveniles usually
springs from a desire to act "in the best interests of the child." But
this phrase can be a convenient excuse rather than a viable standard.8 1 It is unreasonable to think that the best interests of the child
79. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:1-14 to 1-15 (West Supp. 1976) expressly mandate the availability of these and other sources of information. See notes 3-4 supra.
80. In New Jersey, at least, present procedure does not include making available precise
lists of interview questions, but rather general lists of potential inquiries. Robert B. Nicholas,
Acting Chief of the Bureau of Residential Services of DYFS indicated that: "We will provide
a general list of client questionnaires subsequent to the completion of the last interview. This
is a Bureau policy which must be adhered to in order to avoid the coaching of residents."
Letter from Robert B. Nicholas to Rev. Robert J. Vitello, Director of Mount Saint Joseph's
Children's Center, Totowa, N.J. (August 17, 1976) (emphasis added).
81. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
82. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
83. See notes 27-31 supra and accompanying text.
84. See notes 51-67 supra and accompanying text.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See notes 57-66 supra and accompanying text.
88. See notes 51-56 supra and accompanying text.
89. Several child psychologists have urged the adoption of a new standard to replace the
much-criticized "best interests" guideline:
Even though we agree with the manifest purpose of the "in-the-best-interests-of-the
child" standard, we adopt a new guideline for several reasons. First, the traditional
standard does not, as does the phrase "least detrimental" [the proposed new stan-
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can encompass derogation of the child's personality, but state
intervention frequently does just that:'"
The traditional goal of such interventions is to serve "the best interests of
the child." In giving meaning to this goal, decisionmakers in law have
recognized the necessity of protecting a child's physical well-being as a guide
to placement. But they have been slow to understand and to acknowledge
the necessity of safeguarding a child's psychological well-being . . . . Yet
both well-beings are equally important, and any sharp distinction between
them is artificial.

Public oversight of custodial health care institutions is both necessary and desirable. Taxpayers have a right to know that their
funds are being spent in a productive and prudent manner. But as
governmental investigations continue to grow in number, and probe
ever more deeply into the affairs of patients, there will be a greater
need for clearly-drawn supervisory standards to regulate investigation procedures.
The institutionalized emotionally disturbed child does not cease
to be a person merely by reason of his institutionalization. The
essential reason for the child's placement in an institution is to
make possible the development of personality and ability to cope
with society. Measures which deny personal privacy have no place
in such circumstances. An emotionally disturbed child cannot tell
the state whether its funds are being honestly and productively
spent, but an adult who was respected as a child will be a living
testament to the wisdom of efficient and effective child service programs.
dard] convey to the decisionmaker that the child in question is already a victim of
his environmental circumstances, that he is greatly at risk, and that speedy action is
necessary to avoid further harm being done to his chances of healthy psychological
development. Secondly, the old guideline, in context and as construed by legislature,
administrative agency, and court, has come to mean something less than what is in
the child's best interests. The child's interests are often balanced against and frequently made subordinate to adult interests and rights. Moreover, and less forthrightly, many decisions are "in-name-only" for the best interests of the specific child
who is being placed. They are fashioned primarily to meet the needs and wishes of
competing adult claimants or to protect the general policies of a child care or other
administrative agency.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 77, at 54.
90. Id. at 4.

